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The Right to Underwrite? An Actuarial Perspective
With a Difference
Thomas A. Moultrie* and R. Guy Thomas t

Abstract
For a long time underwriting has been a part of the actuarial canon. With
increasing frequency, however, challenges are being issued against the right
of insurance companies to underwrite applications for new bUSiness, arguing
that certain aspects of the practice are undesirably discriminatory.
We explore the role of the actuary in the underwriting process and the challenges that are being set for the profession (as opposed to the life insurance
industry) as a result of this role. As the distinction between the interests of the
actuarial profession and the interests of the life insurance companies has become increasingly blurred, we consider how the profession can maintain this
distinction and so retain its identity as a profession worthy of public trust and
respect.
Key words and phrases: merit goods, fairness, social legitimacy, risk classification, independence, professional status

1

Introduction

In recent years there have been several papers by actuaries commenting on the broad social debate about what the authors call the
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"right to underwrite" or the "freedom to underwrite."l [For example,
see Leigh (1996) in the U.K. and de Ravin and Rump (1996) in Australia.]
These authors see the role of actuaries as defending the insurance industry against criticism from other interest groups which Leigh (for
example) disparages as "the medics, the moralists, and those who are
genetically unfit" (Leigh, 1996, p. 19). In this paper we intend to address
some of the same issues as these authors, but from a more independent
perspective.
We do not mean to imply that life insurance companies should not
seek to influence public debate on underwriting practice to protect their
commercial interests. The response of life insurance companies as an
industry is theirs to make. Such response may include lobbying, public
relations, and sponsorship of research that the industry thinks likely
to support its case. In this regard, the life insurance industry is no different from any other business group pursuing its own agenda. The
issue with which we are concerned, however, is the role of the actuarial profession in the debate on underwriting practice and the need to
articulate a separate, professional, actuarial perspective on the matter.
In our view the right to underwrite is not an issue that should be
examined solely within our discipline or only from the perspectives
of the life insurance industry. It is necessary to look at the nature of
insurance and the role that it plays in SOCiety. The right to underwrite
can be examined accurately only within this broad context.
This paper examines the broad issues first to establish a framework
in which insurance practice can be located. We start by outlining the
special features of insurance business that may lead public policy makers to impose restrictions on underwriting practices. We then examine
alternative concepts of distributive justice and discuss criteria by which
a risk classification scheme may be judged. After noting the limitations
of the actuarial perspective on these issues, we conSider the proper role
of the actuarial profession in underwriting and the broader proper role
of the actuarial profession in society.
1An earlier group of authors, Cummins et aI., (1983), produced a study of risk classification in life insurance. Their study concentrated mainly on the economic, statistical,
and practical aspects risk claSSification, and, as such, may not be germane to our discussion.
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2 The Nature of Insurance
2.1

Special Features of the Insurance Industry

Insurance companies, like all businesses, operate in a social context.
Within this context, however, insurance (particularly insurance of life,
health, and disability risks) has a number of special features that distinguish it from other consumer services. Some of these features may
lead to a perceived need for special regulation of insurance.
First, the seller of insurance insists on selecting the customers to
whom it will sell and on setting different terms for different individual customers; this is not a familiar phenomenon in mass consumer
markets.
Second, the cost of providing the service is not known in advance on
an individual level. This leads to a fundamental tension in all insurance
programs between pooling on the one hand and actuarial rating on the
other. This tension between pooling and pricing means that insurance
has a dual nature. Insurance is like private savings accounts in its actuarial rating features, but it is like public assistance in that payouts are
made selectively to those who suffer loss.
Third, insurance is a collective, communal enterprise; it is redistributive in nature. It redirects resources toward those who suffer loss
and away from those who do not. This feature distinguishes insurance
both from personal savings for adverse contingencies and from other
consumer services. Insurance can be made more or less redistributive,
but it is fundamentally different from other products that do not involve pooling and subsequent redistribution according to need.
Fourth, insurance against certain contingencies may be an example
of a merit good (that is, a good that society conSiders should be available
in certain quantities to all, even to those who do not have the resources
to purchase it in a market transaction).
Fifth, insurance may be a social good (that is, the supply of such a
good generates positive externalities, so that society has an interest in
ensuring that the good is supplied as widely as possible). The notion of
a positive externality refers to the benefits arising from the supply of
the service that accrue to persons other than those to whom the service
is supplied. For example, the satisfaction and sense of well-being of the
present authors may be increased by the knowledge that we live in a
society in which insurance is made available to certain disadvantaged
groups. (In this example, the positive externality is relatively intangible
in nature, but this need not necessarily be the case.)
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Sixth, insurance is unusual because in addition to competing in the
usual ways for service industries-price, level of service, product differentiation, recruitment of employees and agents-the insurers also
compete in risk selection. An insurer that introduces a new underwriting procedure that facilitates the exclusion of higher risks from its
insurance pool gains a competitive advantage over other insurers. This
selection competition does not contribute to the aggregate welfare of
consumers as obviously as do other types of competition, e.g., competition to reduce expenses. It therefore can be argued that public policy
should be directed toward discouraging this bad competition and promoting the good type of competition, e.g. on expense costs and level
of service.

2.2

Insurance as a Merit Good

Certain types of insurance are merit goods that society considers
should be available in certain quantities to all irrespective of ability to
pay. The extent to which particular types of insurance are merit goods
depends on the availability of alternatives to the particular insurance in
meeting social needs. For example, in a jurisdiction such as the United
States where access to adequate medical care is largely dependent on
the purchase of private insurance, insurance disabilities may lead to
broader social disabilities. In other jurisdictions such as the United
Kingdom where a high standard of medical care is guaranteed by the
state, it is less clear that insurance disabilities lead to social disabilities.
In such a society insurance may not be a merit good; one mainstream
political party in the U.K. remains ambivalent about whether it wishes
to encourage or discourage private medical insurance.
Medical insurance is not the only form of insurance for which the
status of the coverage as a merit good is influenced by state benefits.
The existence and level of state-provided death benefit, disability cover,
old age pensions, and other welfare benefits also have implications for
the extent to which the state expects individuals to be able to find private insurance to meet various contingencies.
Another example where private sector insurance disabilities can create broader social disabilities is the provision of mortgage coverage or
home loan business. If lenders generally require such insurance, then
uninsurable members of society are effectively precluded from home
ownership and its associated benefits. Some governments have recognized the need to remedy this social disability. For example, in France
an agreement has been reached between the FFSA (Federation of French
Insurers) and the Ministries of Trade and Health to provide loan secu-
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rity policies to HIV-infected individuals to reduce and limit these social
disabilities.
The relevance of the above examples and the extent to which insurance can be viewed as a merit good differ from country to country.
The trend in recent years in many countries away from state protection
and toward private insurance, however, has tended to increase the extent to which insurance is viewed as a merit good. If private insurance
continues to play an increasing role in meeting social needs, it seems
likely that society's interest in the social legitimacy of risk classification
variables will continue to increase.
Insurance has a number of special features that give it the characteristics of a merit good. Increasingly, this characterization has called
into question the fairness and social legitimacy of insurance practices.
In insurance, however, the concepts of fairness and social legitimacy
are not straightforward.

3 Fairness and Social Legitimacy in Insurance
3.1

Notions of Fairness

Actuaries traditionally have argued that underwriting is justifiably
unequal. This defense assumes that all forms of cross-subsidization
are inherently wrong: "[I]t represents an unfair charge to one individual
or group to subsidize another individual or group" (Paddon, 1990, p.
1363).

Many non-actuarial commentators take the opposite stand. They
argue that, in reality, society may prefer equality to equity (or, more
accurately, society may prefer equality of outcome rather than equality
of assessment). Actuarial fairness may be seen as seeking to place the
costs of misfortune on the unfortunate, a notion of fairness that nonactuarial commentators may regard as rather eccentric (O'Neill, 1997).
How do we decide between these views? The choice between alternative views of fairness is essentially a question of social philosophy. It
is not an actuarial question, and actuarial science is of little assistance
in answering the question.
Probably the most influential concept of fairness over the last 25
years has been that proposed by the Canadian philosopher John Rawls
(1972). Rawls' seminal book runs mote than 600 pages and has spawned
an extensive literature; here we can do no more than sketch the central
concepts.
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There are two aspects to the Rawlsian notion of fairness: the principle of greatest equal freedom and the principle of difference. (There
is also a principle of equality of opportunity, but that does not pertain
to the issues that we consider here.) The first principle, the principle of
greatest equal freedom, says that each person or organization should
have the widest possible freedom, but only to the extent that is compatible with the possession of equal freedom by other persons. The
second principle, the principle of difference, says that inequalities may
be justified, provided that they make even the poorest members of a
society better off than they would otherwise have been. Rawls argues
that these principles will be acceptable to all if they place themselves
behind a veil of ignorance; that is, they assume that when chOOSing
the principles by which society should operate, they do not know what
position in society they occupy.
It is not obvious from the Rawlsian perspective that fairness in insurance must mean equal treatment for equal risks. Nor is it obvious that the life insurers' unfettered freedom to underwrite as advocated by Leigh (1996) is consistent with Rawlsianjustice. Such freedom
for insurance companies may have adverse effects on the freedom of
individuals-for example, if this freedom for insurers prevents individuals from obtaining adequate health care. In most societies the sick and
disabled include some of the poorest individuals. It is difficult to see
how their exclusion from insurance risk pools can make these individuals better off than they otherwise would have been. The freedom-tounderwrite principle may fail to satisfy either facet of Rawlsian justice.
The Rawlsian perspective is only one view of justice, albeit an influential one; there are a number of alternatives. Some views place a higher
emphasis on merit or reward consequent upon individual choice, and
could be employed in defense of underwriting variables that society
perceives are linked to individual choices (e.g., smoking status).
Other ethical theories may offer more support for the paradigm of
conventional risk classification-although these theories, unlike many
apologists for the insurance industry, generally do not claim to be concerned with fairness.
For example, the principle of utilitarianism-"the greatest good for
the greatest number" -can be seen as supporting the exclusion of a minority of persons from insurance pools. Any utilitarian calculus, however, requires weighting the benefit enjoyed by those able to purchase
insurance marginally more cheaply against the harm suffered by those
excluded from insurance. In jurisdictions where buying insurance is
the means for obtaining adequate health care or other merit goods, exclusion from insurance can cause great harm to the indiVidual. It is not
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obvious that great and fundamental harm to a few is outweighed by a
marginal price benefit for many.
It would be easier to defend current practice if the insurance industry took steps to ameliorate the worst harms caused by risk classification; for example, the industry could establish industry-wide pools to
cover otherwise uninsurable risks. This approach has been followed in
a number of countries, sometimes at the insistence of government and
sometimes on a voluntary basis.

3.2

Social Consent to Insurance Practices

Another feature of a merit good is that it is widely perceived as a
good thing. This is true of life insurance, and the industry's sales depend on this perception. But what happens if life insurance comes to be
seen as undeSirable because it is discriminatory? Experience in other
markets suggests that consumer perceptions on ethical issues can have
a major impact on business. For example, certain U.K. banks suffered
considerable loss of business in the 1980s because of consumer boycotts motivated by the banks' perceived continuing involvement in, and
impliCit support of, the apartheid regime in South Africa. Consumer activism also has had an increasing impact on environmental issues. For
example, in 1995 the Shell Oil Company was forced to abandon its plans
for sinking its Brent Spar oil rig at sea because of a consumer boycott in
several European countries, despite the SCientific evidence on the merits of deep sea disposal as opposed to other decommissioning options
(such as on-shore dismantling).
In both cases the companies initially disparaged criticism as the
work of pressure groups, rather as some underwriters today disparage criticism of their unfettered right to underwrite. Yet in both cases
the companies were eventually made to look foolish, being forced to reverse positions in which they had invested financial and political capital
because of an increasing flood of public comment.
While these examples do not necessarily imply that the insurance
industry will be forced to follow a similar course, they do represent
a warning of the possible consequences for any business that fails to
respond to changes in social opinion.

3.3

Social Legitimacy of Risk ClaSSification Variables

The fairness of insurance classification procedures is a question extending beyond actuarial science. It is not surprising that many non-
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actuarial authors have considered the question of what determines the
legitimacy of a risk classification variable.
For example, Abraham (1985, p. 442) argues that classification variables may be suspect for any of the following reasons.
• A particular characteristic may be used improperly in other fields
and is therefore objectionable on symbolic grounds. For example,
women often are discriminated against in an economic context,
and, therefore, gender is suspect as a classification variable. Insurers ideally would like to disassociate risk classification from
the use of the same variables to stigmatize particular groups, but
this can be difficult to achieve-particularly because insurers play
many roles (e.g., as employers) outside the context of an insurance
contract.
• There may not be enough data to justify the classification.
• Some variables may be used only to the disadvantage of certain
groups and never to their advantage. An example in insurance
is the underwriting of medically impaired lives for life insurance
without a corresponding allowance in annuity prices offered.
Wortham (1986, p. 417) proposes seven criteria for assessing rating
factors (with translation into statistical terminology where appropriate):
• Statistical power. The probability of accepting a life on terms that
would not be used if all relevant facts were known should be as
small as possible.
• Statistical size. The probability of rejecting a life that would be
accepted on the terms proposed if all relevant facts were known
should be as small as possible.
• Causality. Classification factors for which a causal explanation
can be given are preferred to factors for which the link is purely a
statistical correlation and there is no apparent causal explanation.
• Incentives to loss reduction. Classification factors that provide
incentives for the policyholder to reduce the risk of losses are
socially beneficial. For example, if cigarette smoking is viewed as
a matter of free choice rather than an addiction, then classification
by smoker or nonsmoker status provides such an incentive.
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• Controllability. This criterion is a pre-condition for the previous
criterion. A classification variable cannot provide an incentive to
loss reduction unless it is to some extent controlled by the insured.
• Compatibility with social values. This criterion relates to the use
or abuse of the classification variable in other contexts. If a variable is misused or has been misused to disadvantage particular
groups, the use of the variable in insurance may be tainted by association. This situation prevails in many countries with regard
to racial discrimination in insurance.
• Are alternatives to private insurance available? The existence of
such alternatives may result in insurance classifications being of
lesser concern for public policy.
Probably only the first two of these criteria (the statistical criteria)
normally would be considered in any actuarial analysis to determine
an appropriate rating structure. This does not mean that the actuarial
approach is wrong, but it does mean that it is incomplete.

3.4

Limitations of the Actuarial Perspective

To illustrate our view that the actuarial perspective on underwriting
is incomplete, it is instructive to review how actuaries have defined
underwriting.
One such definition of underwriting or risk classification is that it is
"the process of grouping risks with similar risk characteristics so as to
appropriately recognize differences in cost" (Paddon, 1990, p. 1362).
Implicit in this definition is a concept of how we should appropriately recognize differences in cost. What is appropriate depends on
the relative merits of equity and eqUality. The definition implies thatin the market for life insurance, at least-equity is a more desirable
outcome than eqUality. Unlike some other actuaries writing about underwriting, however, Paddon does acknowledge this choice: "As actuaries we do not oppose equality in and of itself. However the means
by which [equality] is increased can have unanticipated consequences,
and in some cases results quite opposite of those intended" (1990, p.
1365).
But actuaries are not the only persons who have access to determining what is fair and what is not. Lawyers, medical practitioners, underwriters, and policy makers all have their own different interpretations
about fairness in insurance.
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Another reason why the actuarial perspective on fairness in insurance is incomplete is that actuaries tend to consider fairness only from
the point of view of existing policyholders. But the issue of distributive
justice can be viewed (Stone, 1990, p. 393) from inside the circle of policyholders or from the vantage point of people who are already ill who
are not policyholders. From a societal perspective, the persons who
need life insurance most (Le., those who are already ill) are precisely
the individuals whom, from within the circle of policyholders, it is economically necessary and fair to exclude. This conflict between views of
fairness from alternative vantage points is the crux of disagreements
over fairness in insurance.

4 The Actuarial ProfeSSion's Role in Underwriting
Underwriting is not a scientific discipline; underwriters frequently
use intuition and experience in making decisions. In principle, the contribution made by actuaries in establishing the statistical justifications
for particular underwriting processes can be seen as scientific. In some
cases, however, the scientific basis of actuaries' underwriting recommendations is difficult to discern.
The demands of practical work necessitate the use of some approximations. But in South Africa, for example, there has been an alarming
trend for risk classification schemes dependent on factors that have
not been properly investigated. Truyens (1993, p. 9), referring to the
post-April 27, 1994 changes in South Africa, asked whether incomebased and education-based rate differentiation would be outlawed as
irrational discrimination. He feared that unless the South African insurance industry could produce actuarial statistics to justify such differentiation, that it would be deemed irrational discrimination. Many
antidiscrimination laws (for example, in New Zealand, the EU, and the
United States) make specific provision for waiver on the grounds of
actuarially justifiable statistics. But if actuaries term particular conclusions "actuarially justifiable" when they are based on suspect foundations as alluded to by Truyens, their credibility with public policy
makers will be eroded.
The credibility of the profeSSion also depends on our acknowledging legitimate non-actuarial concerns pertaining to underwriting procedures. The policy statements of other actuarial bodies recognize
some of the issues associated with the social acceptability of underwriting. For example, the Institute of Actuaries of Australia (1994) has
stated that where chosen risk classification factors have been found to
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be no longer significant or to be socially unacceptable, they have been
removed. They also acknowledge that actuaries need to review continually the factors that they choose in order to "reflect the effect of
emerging statistics and changing social attitudes."
But the actuarial profession needs to recognize that although actuaries establish the statistical justification for particular underwriting
processes, the decision to implement them is a commercial decision
taken by life offices in view of other social forces. This distinction between the role of the actuary as a professional and that of the industry is
crucial if national actuarial associations wish to be regarded as professions (as opposed to trade unions of life insurance company employees
or technicians).
Although our focus has been classification factors that society finds
unacceptable, societal preferences also can have the opposite effect.
For example, if insurers had chosen not to recognize smoking as an
underwriting variable, this position might have been difficult to sustain
in light of increasing public recognition (and disapproval) of the effects
of smoking on mortality.

5 The Actuarial Profession's Role in Society
The previous section concerns the role of the actuarial profession
in underwriting. In this section we broaden the discussion to consider
the proper role of the profession in society and the requirements that
actuaries must meet if society is to regard the actuarial profession as
one worthy of public trust and respect.
Two over-arching requirements for the ongoing social acceptance of
professions are those of independence and social benefiCiation.

5.1

Independence

It is necessary to distinguish the role of the actuary as a scientist
and professional and her (or his) role as a life insurance company employee. As a scientist and as a professional the actuary is constrained
by responsibilities more stringent than those that affe<;t life insurance
companies. Life insurance companies can be assumed to act in a way
that preserves their interests and position in society. If an association of individual actuaries aligns itself too closely with such vested
interests, however, the association risks compromising its professional
identity and integrity.
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One of the key roles of a profession is to be able to articulate both
sides of a debate-to observe the pros and cons of any given course of
action. According to Paddon (1990, p. 1365): "... we have a responsibility to encourage those who make public policy to understand the impact
of a proposal or decision." In recent years the actuarial profession has
not played this role well, at least not with respect to underwriting. The
contribution of actuaries generally has been to act as partisan defenders of the life insurance industry.
While actuaries may side with life insurers on particular issues, the
maintenance of professional status depends on actuaries being perceived as capable of distinguishing a professional viewpoint from the
commercial viewpoint of the life insurance industry.
In a number of countries actuaries' status as professionals is questionable because of actuaries' inability or unwillingness to maintain this
distinction. In South Africa, for example, the problem is exacerbated
by the fact that in recent years the profession has had no input in important social and legal processes, instead choosing to subsume its responses to those of the Life Offices' Association (LOA). In effect, the
message is that the views of the South African actuarial profession are
identical to those held by the LOA.
This apparent lack of independence is potentially damaging not only
to professional status, but also to the profession's prospects for expansion. If actuaries are seen as being uniquely identified with the life
insurance industry, in the longer term this perceived lack of independence can only hinder the growth and expansion of the profession.

5.2

Social Beneficiation

Independence is a necessary, but not suffiCient, condition for the
maintenance of professional status. A second requirement for the longterm surVival of a profession is that of social beneficiation. By this we
mean that the work that we do as professionals should add value to
SOciety.
Some actuaries would argue that performing traditional actuarial
roles in life insurance companies and pension funds is sufficient for this
purpose. If society decides to reevaluate the way in which the insurance
business operates, however, the actuarial profession may come under
scrutiny too. If actuaries are seen to be capable only of defending the
rights of the life insurance industry and its current policyholders, it is
possible that actuaries will be seen as life insurance technicians with
no other role than performing prescribed calculations and lobbying for
those institutions.
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An alternative is to view the social responsibility of the actuary as
extending beyond these institutions. Such an approach would not be
merely altruistic. By demonstrating its ability to look beyond the shortterm interests of its principal employers, the profession could increase
the possibility of expanding and developing its professional influence
into other areas.

6

Summary and Conclusion

Insurance underwriting, like all business practices, operates in a social context. Insurance has a number of distinguishing features that
give it some of the features of a merit good (that is, a good that society
considers should be available in certain quantities even to those who do
not have the resources to purchase it in a private market transaction)
and some of the features of a social good (that is, a good the supply of
which generates positive externalities).
The importance of these features depends on the extent to which
social needs are met by private insurance. If the insurance industry
wants an increasing social role for private insurance and the associated
opportunities for profit, it must accept that society will take a greater
interest in the social legitimacy of risk classification procedures. The
alternative is for the industry to decline this increased social role and
retreat into a more limited position in which its risk classification procedures will be of less concern to society.
Actuaries should recognize that the actuarial perspective on fairness in insurance claSSification has its limitations and that actuaries
are not the only arbiters of fairness. The acceptability of underwriting procedures is societally determined, and a profession that fails to
recognize and make allowances for this may find itself ostracized and
increasingly ignored.
It should be possible for actuaries to take a different position from
that of their principal employers in the debate on underwriting and in
other debates where corporate and professional views are not necessarily congruent. Unless actuaries are perceived as being capable of
holding a different view-whether they do so in practice or not-the
professional status of the actuarial profession could come under threat.
If actuaries are to survive as a profession-one that actively engages
in debate and the expansion of knowledge and that is aware of its responsibilities to society-actuaries must challenge themselves about
what it means to be an actuary, as opposed to an employee of a life
insurance company.
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